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　本稿では、Keenan（1971）で論じられた前提と断定という語用論的な概念が、認識的モ
ダリティの主観性を説明する際に重要な役割を果たすことを示す。そして、認識論理学に
おける可能世界の概念がモダリティの分析に光をあてると主張する。
　第１節で、前提と断定の概念を定義し、第２節で、主観的モダル表現の統語的性質を論
じる。主観的モダリティを含む表現は、疑問、文代名詞化、否定、時制の作用域に入るこ
とができないことを示す。第３節で、可能世界と認識論理学について考察し、第４節で、
今後の課題を述べる。
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0. Introduction
　　　In this paper, it will be shown that the pragmatic notions of presupposition and 
assertion play an important role in accounting for the subjectivity of epistemic modality 
and that notions in epistemic logic and in possible world semantics shed light on the 
analysis of modality.  Lastly, the possible objections to this approach will be examined 
and the possibility of formalizing our linguistic intuitions will be explored.
　　　Here the present analysis is restricted to epistemic modals which express 
possibility and necessities as in the following sentences.
　(1) It may be raining in Chicago. - Karttunen (1971).
　(2) Possibly the gazebo was built by Sir Christopher Wren.
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　- Halliday (1970)
　(3) It is possible that John is bald.
　(4) I must have loved Audrey all the time. 
　　　　　　　　　　　　　-A. Christie, Towards Zero (TZ) p.25
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　　　I will not discuss deontic modals which express permissions and obligations as in 
the following sentences:
　(5) I must be making my way homewards. - TZ p.4
　(6) May I conclude that you like him? 
　　　　　-E.M. Forster, Where Angels Fear to Tread p.36
Section 1 introduces the definition of assertion and presupposition. Section 2 discusses 
syntactic characteristics of subjective modality.  It will be shown that subjective modal 
expressions cannot be in the scope of question, sentence pronominalization, negation 
and tense. Section 3 discusses possible worlds1 and epistemic logic. Lastly, residual 
problems are discussed in Section 4.
1. Assertion and Presupposition
　　　Definitions of presupposition differ among approaches. According to Keenan 
(1971), there are two main definitions of presuppositions: logical and pragmatic. Logical 
presuppositions are defined ultimately on the relation between base structures and 
the world, whereas pragmatic presuppositions are defined on the relation between 
utterances and their contexts. In this paper, I will tentatively adopt the pragmatic 
definition of presuppositions. An assertion is taken to be a notion that contrasts with 
presupposition. For instance, in (7) which is considered to be an answer to the question, 
“Who killed Cock Robin？”, the presupposition is (7a) and the assertion is (7b).
　(7) JOHN killed Cock Robin.
　(7a)λx (x killed Cock Robin) is {well-defined/ under discussion}.
　(7b) JOHN ∈λx (x killed Cock Robin)
　　　　　　　　　(cf. Ota (1980), Jackendoff (1972:Chapter 6))
In (7a) a lambda-operator λ is used instead of an existential operator ∃ since the value 
of x can be zero, i.e. the truth value is false, such as in the case of no one.) Jackendoff 
(1972:230) calls JOHN in (7) “focus of a sentence” which denotes the information in 
the sentence that is assumed by the speaker but is not shared by the speaker and 
the hearer. A “presupposition of a sentence” is defined as denoting the information 
that is assumed by the speaker to be shared by the speaker and the hearer. Thus my 
definition of presupposition is based on context-dependent informational structure. 
Explanatory adequacy of my approach will be discussed in the last section, comparing it 
with a logical (not pragmatic) approach. Presuppositions and assertions are determined 
in the domain of discourse grammar rather than sentence grammar. The domain of 
discourse grammar roughly corresponds to Halliday’s notion of ‘textual function’, which 
distinguishes old information from new information.
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2. Syntactic characteristics of Subjective epistemic modality
　　　The idea that subjective modality forms a continuous scale rather than discrete 
notions has been supported by many linguists (cf. Halliday (1970), Horn (1972), Lyons 
(1977), Teramura (1979)). I will not, however, concern myself here with the problem of 
whether epistemic modality is divided by discrete notions of subjectivity vs．objectivity 
or it is a continuum with gradation. Nor am I going to fit subjective epistemic modality 
and objective epistemic modality into a theoretical model like a tripartite utterance in 
Lyons (1977).
　　　Compared with expressions like it is possible that and it is certain that, 
expressions such as I think, may, must, certainly can be regarded as expressing 
more subjective aspects of subjective epistemic modality. I will point out that these 
more subjective expressions (e.g. I think, may, must, certainly, etc.) exhibit syntactic 
behaviors different from objective expressions (e.g. it is possible that, it is certain that, 
etc.) with respect to question, pronominalization, negation, and tense in discourse. I 
will account for their properties using the notions presuppositions and assertions, and 
notions in epistemic logic.
　　　First, let us consider the difference between the following expressions (8) and (9). 
(8), where the first person subject is used, is more subjective than (9), where the third 
person subject is used.
　(8) I think the Giants will win the pennant next year.
　(9) Mary thinks the Giants will win the pennant next year.
The difference between these two utterances emerges when their syntactic behaviors 
are examined with respect to question, pronominalization, negation, and tense.
　　　To begin with, let us examine whether subjective modality can be the focus 
of question, i.e. the element that is questioned. (8) above cannot be made into a tag 
question. # indicates a pragmatically unacceptable utterance.2
　(8a) # I think the Giants will win the pennant next year, don’t I?
　(8b) I think the Giants will win the pennant next year, won’t they?
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(cf. Hooper(1975))
　(9a) Mary thinks the Giants will win the pennant next year, doesn’t she?
Moreover, (8) cannot be formed into a question as in (10), but (9) can be as in (11):
　(10) #Do I think the Giants will win the pennant next year?
　(11) Does she think the Giants will win the pennant next year?
(10) and (11) can be rendered acceptable only in a very special context where the 
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speaker is asking herself whether she is really thinking (excepting echo-questions, of 
course). Thus, subjective epistemic modality cannot be the focus of question, i.e. cannot 
be questioned. In the utterance (8), the embedded sentence constitutes the assertion 
and λ x (I think x) can be regarded as presupposition:
　(8c) presupposition : λ x (I think x) is {well-defined/ under discussion}. 
　　　assertion : the Giants will win the pennant next year ∈λx (I think x)
On the other hand, in utterance (9), the whole matrix sentence including Mary thinks 
can be asserted.
　(9b) presupposition : λ x (x happens) is {well-defined/ under discussion}. 
　　　 assertion : Mary thinks the Giants will win the pennant next year ∈λx (x 
happens)
　　　Unacceptability of (8a) and (10) is accounted for if we assume that presupposition 
cannot be questioned. Assertions, on the other hand, can be questioned, hence (8b), 
(9a) and (11) are acceptable. Questions (8a) and (10) ask whether λx (I think x) is under 
discussion, i.e. #Is λx (I think x) under discussion?, which contradicts with the definition 
of presupposition. Why then do assertions in (8) and (9) take different scopes as in (8) the 
embedded sentence in (9) the matrix sentence? This question is considered later with 
respect to the grammatical person of the main clause subject and epistemic logic.
　　　Secondly, let us look at subject epistemic modality in terms of sentence 
pronominalization.
　　　Expressions like (8) cannot be inside the scope of so, but (9) can:
　(12) A: I think the Giants will win the pennant next year.
　　　B: I don’t think so. I think the Tigers will.
　　　In (12), the scope of so is in the embedded sentence, the Giants will win the 
pennant next year, which is the assertion of A’s utterance.
　(13) A: Mary thinks the Giants will win the pennant next year.
　　　B: If so, she is too optimistic. I am afraid they won’t.
In (13), the scope of so is A’s assertion, the entire matrix sentence Mary thinks the 
Giants will win the pennant next year. The sentence pro-form so can be regarded as 
taking only the assertion but not the presupposition of the utterance as its scope. We 
can clearly see that the subjective epistemic modality as in (8) does not fall within the 
scope of sentence pronominalization.
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     Thirdly, let us examine subjective epistemic modality in relation to negation. The 
presuppositional partλx(I think x) in (8) cannot be negated. As in (14), it sounds really 
strange to negate the utterance (8). Note that in contrast to the anomalousness of 
negating the whole utterance, the negation of the assertion of (8) is perfectly acceptable. 
On the other hand, as in (15), we can negate the whole utterance since the subject of 
the main clause is not the first person.
　(14) A: I think the Giants will win the pennant next year.
　　　B: #No, you don’t.  (cf. I don’t think so.)
　(15) A: Mary thinks the Giants will win the pennant next year.
　　　B: No, she doesn’t.
We have seen that subject epistemic modality of the “I think” type is outside the scope 
of negation. Here are other examples of this type.
　(16) a. Certainly she is not a beauty.
　　　b. She may not be happy.
　　　c. She must not be happy.
　　　Lastly, we will consider the relation between subjective modality and tense. 
Halliday (1970) observed that sentence (17) which expresses objective modality cannot 
be replaced by expressions of subjective modality such as (18) and (19).
　(17) It was certain that this gazebo had been built by Wren until the discovery of the 
title–deeds.
　(18) #This gazebo must have been built by Wren until the discovery of the title–
deeds.
　(19) #Certainly this gazebo had been built by Wren until the discovery of the title–
deeds.
In (17), the period when people were certain is specified in terms of the until-clause. (17) 
implies that it is not certain anymore. The past tensed was in (17) indicates the certainty 
is in the past. The truth value of it is certain that p is ensured until the discovery of 
the title-deeds. Both (18) and (19) express the speaker’s present conviction of the past 
event, hence subjective modality cannot co-occur with the until-clause. Thus, generally, 
subjective modality cannot co-occur with adverbial clauses which indicate the time 
other than the time of speaker’s utterance. Clearly there is a difference in subjectivity 
between the present form I think and the past tensed I thought.
　(20) I thought you liked her until I realized that you actually hate her.
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　(21) #I think this gazebo was built by Wren until the discovery of the title–deeds.
The expression, I thought in (20), allows the speaker to revise his opinion. We have seen 
that subjective modality does not take its scope inside the past tense.
　　　In this section, it was shown that utterances expressing subjective modality 
cannot be the focus of question, pronominalization, negation, and tense.
3. Possible worlds and Epistemic Logic
　　　In the previous section, we have seen that modal expressions containing the 
first person singular present differ from those containing the third person or past tense 
in that the former cannot be questioned or negated.  This was due to their difference 
in the scope of assertions. In this section, let me clarify the reason why this scope 
difference in assertions arises in terms of possible worlds and epistemic logic.
　　　A clear definition of possible worlds requires further investigation, but here I will 
follow the system of Hintikka (1962, 1969)3. 
　(22) a. Any model set W that contains some atomic formula p does not contain its 
negation:i.e. if p ∈ W then 〜p∉W
　　　b. There is some other model set W*, that is an alternative to W, and contains the 
formula 〜p : 〜p ∈ W*
　　　　　　　　　　(Karttunen (1971), Uchida (1978))
With regard to the notion of possible worlds, epistemic modality can be defined in terms 
of speaker’s knowledge. It is epistemically impossible to know what the beliefs of others 
are. The speaker and the others, or the speaker in the present and the speaker in the 
past are considered to belong to distinct possible worlds. This is why we can question 
whether others have the belief before questioning what their belief is.
　(23) “Audrey thinks it would be quite a good thing.”
　　　 “Audrey – what do you mean, Audrey thinks? How do you know what Audrey 
thinks?” – TZ, p.23
The speaker cannot assert the proposition which is contradictory to what she or he 
knows as in (24a) since her or his assertion and her or his knowledge seems to belong 
to the same possible world. On the other hand, (24b) where the speaker’s assertion and 
Fred’s belief are contradictory is well-formed since they belong to distinct possible 
worlds.
　(24) a.  #The cat is on the mat, but I don’t know whether the cat is on the mat.
　　　　–Karttunen (1971)
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　　　b. The cat is on the mat, but Fred does not believe it.
　　　As we will see in (25a) and (25c) below the speaker cannot assert the fact that 
she or he knows with no qualifications or using factive predicates, in conjunction with 
what she or he epistemically believes to be otherwise:
　(25) a.  # It isn’t raining in Chicago, but it may be raining there. 
　　　　–Karttunen (1971) (no qualifications)
　　　b.  {I think/ I believe} it isn’t raining in Chicago, but it may be raining there. －
ibid.
　　　c.  #{I know/I admit} it isn’t raining in Chicago, but it may be raining there.　 
(factive predicate)
The first conjuncts of (25a) and (25c) constitute the speaker’s assertion of the fact or 
asserts that she/he knows the fact, whereas the first conjunct of (25b) merely indicates 
that the speaker has certain belief. Holding belief differs from having knowledge in the 
degree of commitment to the truth-value of the proposition. This may be the reason 
why (25a,c) and (25b) differ in acceptability.    
　　　Expressions containing two subjective epistemic modal expressions like (25b) 
which has I think/I believe and may form two kinds of possible worlds. For instance, 
in the case of (25b) the world in which `it is raining` is true and the world in which 
‘it is not raining’ is true. The speaker is committed to two alternative beliefs or two 
alternative possible worlds.
　　　Two alternative possible worlds are expressed also in the following sentences: 
　(26) Maybe John used to drink coffee, but has now stopped doing so. 
　(27) Perhaps John has no children, but perhaps his children are away on vacation. 
－ Liberman (1973)
　(28) I think you’d better leave, or I’m afraid there’ll be trouble. － ibid.
　(29) The man may be a duke or he may be an organ-grinder. － WA,p.31.
In this section, it was shown that the scopal difference between subjective modal 
expressions and objective expressions arise because the former in principle cannot have 
two alternative possible wor1ds.
4. Residual Problems
　　　Lastly, let us compare our pragmatic approach of presuppositions and possible 
worlds with more formal approach in Ben-Chorin (1982), which is in the general boolean 
algebraic  framework of Keenan & Faltz (1978). In Ben-Chorin (1982), propositions are 
defined as properties of possible worlds.
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　　　The characteristics of Sentential Complement denotations are as follows:
　　　1)  All of them have the unit property, which is taken to be the denotation of 
proposition.
　　　2)  They are maximally consistent sets, i.e. ∀ p ∈ P, exactly one of either p or p’ 
can be in any individual.
As we have seen in (22a) our approach also defines possible worlds as maximally 
consistent sets.
　　　It seems that our approach can be incorporated into a formal framework, except 
that presuppositions logically defined may be too strong.
　　　There are some claims that presuppositions are belief-independent (Keenan 
(1971)).  Although I mentioned the connection between belief and presuppositions, I did 
not explicitly formalize their relations here. All these problems will be open to future 
investigation.
Notes
*This paper is based on the term paper written around 1982-1983 for the Semantics 
class taught by Prof. Ed Keenan at UCLA. Many years have passed since then. I 
kept the original claims of the paper. It should be noted that this paper was before 
Mats Rooth (1985) and the recent development of Generalized Quantifier Theory and 
semantic theories in general mentioned in Portner (2009). I did not incorporate the 
findings thereafter in this paper.
1  The notion of “possible worlds” was first introduced by Leibniz (1952). This notion 
plays an important role in modern logic and semantics. For instance, our universe (the 
“actual world”) is a possible world.　But we can imagine other possible worlds which 
are like our world except there is a minor change in some detail. There is a possible 
world in which it is raining, and there is another possible world in which it is not.
2  A reviewer points out that (8a) is acceptable in a context where the speaker said 
before “I think Giants will win the pennant next year”, and later again confirm his 
utterance which he had conveyed previously. Here such “echo-question” contexts are 
excluded from consideration in (8a) and (10).
3  See Moori (1980) for an informal but insightful explanation of possible worlds.
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